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Doing the dirty washing 
Women as the scapegoats of the New Right 
ANNE ELSE 
DOING THE WASHING is an untidy business. So untidy, in fact, that US city councillor James Fragoli 
wants to impose fines of US$1000 on anyone hanging 
washing in their front yard. But someone asked Council-
lor Fragoli a very smart question: what happens to his 
washing? His reply: "I come home, my wife has it done. I 
don' t know what she 
children is a full-time job in itself; yet like other means-
tested benefits, it does not recognise that few two-parent 
non-beneficiary families can now rely solely on one male 
wage for more than a short time. 
The old division of labour now operates to the full 
only in a minority of households, and generally only for 
relatively short periods. Fewer women of almost any age 
are living in partnership with men. Not surprisingly, fewer 
women are having 
does to it." <~minioll, 1997) 
As False Economy 
(Else, 1996) demon-
strates, women are 
held responsible - and 
for the most part, hold 
themselves responsible 
- for cleaning up most 
of society's everyday 
dirty washing. But 
they are also responsi-
ble for keeping this 
messy business out of 
sight and out of mind, 
so that it does not in-
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children, and women 
are having fewer chil-
dren. Pakeha women 
are delaying having 
children, and Maori 
women may be start-
ing to do so too. Most 
women now spend 
most of their adult 
lives in paid work, or 
looking for it. Yet rap-
idly increasing num-
bers of women, and 
men too, are having to 
turn to the state for the 
trude on the real business of the world. If they fail in 
either task, they risk severe penalties. 
Yet dealing with dirty washing, including the messy 
business of bearing and raising children and caring for 
the elderly, gets paid little or nothing. So how are women 
to survive financially, in a society where survival de-
pends absolutely on access to money income, and unpaid 
work is just that- unpaid? 
Since the Industrial Revolution, the glib answer has 
come back: by finding, and keeping, a male breadwinner, 
so that he can keep her, and his children. Women's finan-
cial dependence on men has been the linchpin of 
industrialised society. The ideal of complementary mar-
riage has served as a convenient mechanism for keeping 
the dirty washing of everyday caring work largely off the 
public agenda, let alone the public purse. 
All other possible family forms were until recently 
literally outlawed. Apart from widows' pensions, only in 
the last 25 years has there been any statutory state sub-
sidy for those caring for children without a male partner. 
Even then, the model has been one of replacing the miss-
ing share of a male wage with a meagre state substitute. 
Unlike the unemployment benefit, the domestic purposes 
benefit has been based on the premise that caring for 
money they need to support themselves and their children. 
As Brian Easton has recently pointed out, New Zea-
land's welfare state, like Australia's, was based strongly 
on full employment (or rather, full male employment), 
which earned enough to trickle down to women and chil-
dren . Ironically, the consequence of current high 
unemployment is that although the welfare state "is pre-
sented as a means of protecting the individual against 
adverse circumstances ... when the economy persistently 
experiences adverse circumstances, the welfare state is 
unable to function properly. "<••"""· 1996•"l 
In 1976 the state was paying out around 19,000 do-
mestic purposes benefits (DPB); by 1996, the number was 
close to 109,000. But this rise is dwarfed by the rise in 
unemployment benefits. They jumped from around 3,000 
in 1977 to over 134,000 in 1996. Sickness and invalid ben-
efits have also reached an all-time high. By mid 1996, 
around 350,000 income tested benefits were operative; 
they were supporting over 45,000 people as dependent 
spouses, together with over 263,000 children under 16 -
about 28% of all dependent children.<osW,J9%b; MWA,I9Y7J 
These statistics are of course merely snapshots of one 
point in time. For all its ability to match up files with 
other departments in order to track down benefit fraud, 
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the Department of Social Welfare cannot accurately track 
how often particular people access various benefits. How-
ever, it seems clear that inability to find any form of 
long-term employment is growing; that the average time 
spent on the DPB is steadily rising, along with the age profile 
of recipients; and that the older you are when you become 
unemployed, the longer you are likely to be out of a job. 
Now here is the $64,000 question, or rather set of 
questions. Is the rising level of "welfare dependency" a 
problem? If so, why, and for whom? What is causing this 
problem? And what is the solution? In other words, what 
does welfare dependency mean? 
Even when it is out of the question for a beneficiary 
to get a job that pays a living wage, income tested benefits 
have never been generous. Since the 1991 benefit cuts and 
rent increases, they have sunk well below any realistic 
poverty line. For this reason alone, having large numbers 
of people, especially children, on benefits for longer than 
a very short time is indeed a major problem. Unless ben-
eficiaries can earn a large amount illegally, they and their 
children will almost inevitably be living in poverty. That 
is bad for them, bad for the local and national community, 
bad for the economy, and bad for the future. 
But for those in charge of policy, the poverty of benefici-
aries is not the central issue. The brochure for the 1997 
Beyond Dependency conference uses the word "poverty" 
only once - in a biography of an overseas speaker. The 
Department of Social Welfare's briefing papers to the incom-
ing government do not use it at all. They refer to "low 
income", "loss of income", "families at risk", and "cycles of 
disadvantage", but not to poverty. They do not mention the 
1991 benefit cuts and rent increases, let alone the Employ-
ment Contracts Act. They do refer, albeit rarely, to the growth 
of unemployment, as a major factor putting families "at 
risk"; but they stress that 
employment is now grow-
ing. WELFARE DEPENDENCY 
problem, and it brings a whole raft of other problems. The 
dependency figures are set alongside and implicitly linked 
with figures on a range of major social problems, or as the 
briefing papers put it, "Crises in Families", such as youth 
suicide and crime, school suspensions, teenage ex-nuptial 
births, child abuse, and male family violence. In other 
words, the benefit-dependent family is a dysfunctional 
family. What we are not told, however, is the fact that in 
any one year, fewer than 6% of the children of beneficiar-
ies are the subject of notifications to the Children, Young 
Persons and their Families Service.<Rochford and Walker, 1996) 
How has the increase in dependency come about? 
The briefing papers refer vaguely to "social and economic 
changes". They speak of unemployment, and growth in 
sole parent families, as if these were natural phenomena. 
They have much more to say about the role of the benefit 
system itself. The central problem is that so far it has "not 
required the beneficiary to take active steps to reduce 
their chances of needing a benefit in the future. "<DSW,J99"''l 
Nor has it encouraged beneficiaries to contribute to soci-
ety. "Contributing" means "directing time and energy 
into enhancing the lives of others, in contrast to simply 
being in passive receipt of benefits."(Dsw. 1996'7J But at no 
point is there any reference to any research showing ex-
actly what beneficiaries do all day, or how much they are 
already contributing through working in their homes and 
communities. Nor is there any discussion of how all paid 
work depends on unpaid work - including the unpaid 
work of beneficiaries. 
Although "contribution" is discussed, the major solu-
tion to benefit dependency is nothing less than "self-reliance". 
Self-reliance means "being independent of the benefit sys-
tem for most working age people."<osw,J" 6'7> Self-reliance 
is important, because "A healthy society and economy is 
It is easy to overlook 
just how fast and extensive 
the collapse of full employ-
ment and of male wage 
support for women and 
children has been. The 
graph on the right, from the 
DSW Briefing Papers for the 
1996 incoming government, 
shows the overall picture; 
but note the directive 
caption.<DSW,J996"7J 
Economic and employment growth have not reduced total numbers of working-age beneficiaries . 
The graph is followed 
by a scary set of statistics 
about the growth of de-
pendency. The central 
message is that welfare de-
pendency i !self is the 
180,000 
160,000 
140,000 
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Actual Forecast 
Unemployment 
based on cycles of nurturing families and capable self-
reliant adults."<osw.1,..'161 
In fact the two are not "cycles", they take place si-
multaneously. Exactly how they are to be combined is not 
clear. It is not possible for caregivers to be in two places at 
once. Yet the new policy approach, based on the fact of 
women's increasing labour force participation, is to ex-
pect sole mothers and the wives of unemployed men to 
combine nurturing with wage-earning. This may require 
offering some state help with "removing barriers to work", 
such as "childcare and home management skills", or "re-
ferral to appropriate agencies to obtain relevant 
training".<05W·1996•261 The briefing papers cite lack of accept-
able and affordable childcare as one of the main barriers 
to "greater self-reliance". After all, as they note elsewhere, 
two out of three DPB recipients have a youngest child under 
seven. (In other words, the group of unpartnered mothers 
most prone to be heavily, if not exclusively, reliant on a 
benefit for income closely parallels the group of partnered 
mothers most likely to be heavily reliant on another's wage.) 
But they do not comment on the implications of the 
fact that most sole parents are in fact women, as are almost 
all the "spouses" of those getting the married rate of 
benefit. Nowhere do they mention the large and widen-
ing gap between men's and women's earnings in this 
country, the much greater typical disparity in lifetime 
earnings, or the fact that the Employment Contracts Act 
has made the equal pay legislation literally unworkable. 
The second graph, below, gives the overall picture: it 
shows that despite greater participation in the paid 
workforce, half of all women earned under $15,000 in 
1991, and that the only age groups for which the male and 
female medians converge are under 20 and over 70. 
The DSW briefing paper section on sole parents com-
pares the high rate of workforce participation by Swedish 
sole parents with the low rate. It notes that a high propor-
tion of Swedish sole mothers work part-time only, and 
73% of their children have a place in public child care. But 
in a recent paper, Professor Maureen Baker of McGill 
University, Montreal, points out that the high rate of em-
ployment has come about through far more than "an 
extensive system of public child care services" . The Swed-
ish government has "established public sector jobs with 
statutory protections, developed lengthy paid family leave 
policies [for all parents, sole or partnered] ... ensured pay 
equity, and actively promoted gender equality" .<"''"·1997.1<1 
By contrast, in Canada, as in New Zealand, work 
incentives and "employability" for sole parents are being 
promoted "within a context of high unemployment, low 
minimum wages, little emphasis on job creation, a lack of 
full-time jobs [especially secure ones] with high wages 
and statutory protections, and a shortage of child care 
services."<"''"· 1"'•1<1 Professor Baker concludes that under 
these circumstances, "neither paying mothers to raise their 
children at home nor encouraging them to find paid work 
has resolved"- or is likely to resolve- "the problem of 
poverty among sole mothers".<"''"· 199?.151 But this conclu-
sion may be irrelevant to current discussions of welfare 
policy which focus not on how to resolve poverty but on 
how to get people off benefits . 
Considerable unease about the prospect of getting 
large numbers of beneficiaries into self-reliant jobs comes 
through repeatedly in the DSW briefing papers. The writ-
ers do not highlight the fact that unemployment levels are 
still extremely high, particularly for 
MEDIAN TOTAL INCOME OF MEN & WOMEN, 
BY AGE GROUP, 1991 
Maori and Pacific Islands people, and 
that what could be called "living wage 
unemployment" is higher still. However, 
they do note that 29% of all jobs are now per year 
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part-time, that local conditions vary, and 
that there is research showing that wel-
fare dependency "has more to do with 
lack of opportunity than inappropriate 
attitudes". <DSW, 1996•261 
As for what are called active assist-
ance programmes, the briefing papers 
note simply that customised service, the 
"delivery platform for benefit adminis-
tration", has a staff to customer ratio of 
1:250. The "more intensive" programmes 
have ratios of 1:125 and 1:60. (osw, 19%•271 
There is also a slightly acerbic com-
ment on evaluation of active assistance 
programmes in Wisconsin (that's the 
state which requires mothers of 12-week-
old babies to be available for work) . The 
evaluators found that "raising the 
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number of staff to a level where there was enough staff to 
actually monitor all clients raised participation rates 
significantly".rosw, 1996'30' But taking on more staff means 
spending more money, at least in the short term. Providing 
childcare and training also costs money. So does topping 
up the now large pool of wages which are even lower 
than benefits. All these additional costs could quickly add 
up to the same as, or even more than, the DPB itself. 
The DSW briefing papers do not attempt to put for-
ward strategies aimed at reducing either unemployment 
or the sole parent population, as a way of reducing wel-
fare dependency. But others do. 
Current New Right analysis focuses strongly on high 
and growing welfare dependency.It is seen as a major prob-
·lem- but not as the problem. It is only the worst symptom of 
the real problem, which is category-based, unlimited du-
ration, as-of-right, uncapped state social provision. 
This is presented as by far the biggest blot on an 
otherwise radically transformed policy landscape. Two 
main strategies are being brought to bear on it. Both in-
volve taking charge of the questions, as well as the 
answers. In other words, they offer explanations which in 
turn determine policy directions. 
The first strategy deals with poverty itself. The New 
Right is genuinely concerned about poverty. Not only 
does it result in the redistribution of great wadges of 
public money which could be much better spent by cor-
porate heads; it also gives the lie, very publicly, to the 
much vaunted success of economic restructuring. 
That's why so much energy is currently being de-
voted to explaining poverty away. (See, for example, 
Barker, 1996 and Bates, 1996.) The explanations begin by 
asserting that there is no "real", that is, absolute, poverty 
in New Zealand (or the USA, or Britain), compared with, 
say, Calcutta, or the Depression of the 1930s. (As Toni 
Allwood (1997) of WIN on Poverty has recently pointed 
out, this is like saying that there is no "real" child abuse in 
New Zealand, compared with, say, the child brothels of 
Thailand, or Victorian London - and therefore we need 
do nothing about it.) 
It is admitted that relative poverty may indeed exist, 
and may even have spread and worsened over recent 
years; but the claim is that this does not matter, either 
because it does not last long (people move out of it), or 
because inequality itself does not matter. Those who be-
lieve it does, so we are told, have been captured by the 
politics of envy. What really matters is increasing the size 
of the national cake. Any attempt at redistribution from 
richer to poorer is said to shrink the cake, because it 
interferes with market freedom. 
The second strategy centres on welfare. (See, for ex-
ample, Morgan, 1995; Green, 1996; Bennett, 1996.) The 
argument is that welfare dependency is a problem not 
because it leads to poverty, but because it signifies moral 
decay. The cited proof of moral decay is the rise in the 
number of sole parents. And the major cause of this rise is 
presented as welfare. 
The conclusion is that the state must therefore insti-
tute drastic reforms of its welfare programmes, such as 
time limits on benefits, workfare, capped funds, and, wher-
ever possible, the removal of the right to assistance itself. 
Within the limits of New Right economic principles, the 
state should do all it can to reinforce legal marriage and 
encourage men to support their wives and children finan-
cially, for example, through tax breaks for married male 
breadwinners with dependent wives. There should be no 
assistance for sole parents which does not also go to mar-
ried ones. The small amount of welfare assistance which 
proves to be absolutely necessary should come not from 
the public sector, but from the private, because that is 
morally and socially better for both donors and recipients . 
This strategy, say New Right theorists, will all but 
eliminate the problem of welfare dependency. It will also 
restore the self-reliance and social and moral patterns of 
the 1950s. If there is no unemployment benefit, men will 
get jobs, then wives, and stay with both. If there is no 
DPB, few men will abandon their wives and children, and 
few women will get pregnant to men who are not their 
husbands. If they do, they must take the consequences. 
It is claimed that mothers who have to get jobs -
widows, for example, or victims of domestic violence -
will be able to, because contrary to feminist propaganda, 
there is now no such thing as discrimination in the 
workplace, there is only choice. If women choose to have 
children, and then choose to stay at home and look after 
them, or need to take constant time off, of course they will 
earn less, just as they will if they choose to be nurses instead 
of doctors, or teachers instead of lawyers.rr~• '"• Lyn,h, 19951 
Whether they are marr.ied or single, women who can't 
afford to keep a child should not choose to have one. 
As Jane Kelsey has noted (1997), the language of the 
New Right in New Zealand has generally been that of 
neutral logic and technology. But the moral dimension 
has been there all along and it gathered force when Ruth 
Richardson came to power. In February, for example, the 
National Business Review featured a reprint of an article in 
the Wall Street Journal by Irving Kristol of the extreme 
right-wing Enterprise Institute. It was headed "Forget the 
money, welfare state's crisis is spiritual". 
According to the New Right rhetoric the family is 
being destroyed by the welfare state, because it is welfare 
itself which has brought about a "poisonous flowering" 
of "crime, illegitimacy, drugs, divorce, sexual promiscu-
ity". We know this is so, because "in times past, when 
economic inequality and lack of opportunity were cer-
tainly no less evident than today (and for most people 
were probably much greater), such social pathologies were 
far less widespread." But now the welfare state has induced 
once sturdily self-reliant citizens to yield up "the right of 
·self-government in return for cradle-to-grave security". The 
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resulting lack of financial responsibility and commitment, 
combined with a "bland, permissive toleration of moral 
irresponsibility", leads to "national decadence". <Kn•tol, 1997l 
In other words, a new moral panic is now being gener-
ated. The victims of New Right policies are being made the 
scapegoats for the failure of those policies to deliver the 
general prosperity they promised. The central focus is on 
the delinquent women who have failed to cope with soci-
ety's dirty washing, and are now blamed for creating it. 
We have been 
here before. In the 
19th and early 20th 
century, it was care-
less, ignorant women 
neglecting children. In 
the first world war, it 
was sinful women 
spreading venereal 
disease. In the Depres-
sion, it was selfish 
women resorting to 
abortion (there have 
been frequent re-runs 
of this one). And in the 
1950s, it was morally 
defective, promiscu-
ous teenage temptresses luring innocent boys into carnal 
knowledge. 
But the perennial favourite has been women who 
give birth to and/or bring up children outside marriage-
and so give the lie to the whole system of financial de-
pendence on men. Panics over this group occurred in the 
1960s, the 1970s, the 1980s, and now again in the 1990s. 
It is hard to see how restigmatising illegitimacy can 
work. (That term, of course, no longer has any legal status 
in New Zealand with regard to children.) Just over 40%, 
or two out of every five births, now take place outside 
marriage- though not, of course, necessarily outside part-
nership or the extended family. In 1996 there were 23,499 
births outside marriage, and 34,292 births inside it. With 
numbers like these, it seems almost pointless to go on 
counting who is in and who is out. What was once the 
unmentionably dirty washing of illegitimacy has been 
transformed into the clean washing of parenthood. 
But now the New Right is doing its utmost to dirty it 
again. 
Illegitimacy looms so large not because it is seen as 
sexually immoral, but because it is seen as economically 
immoral. This is now the only kind of immorality which 
matters. New Right discussions typically slide seamlessly 
from "illegitimacy" to "sole parents" to "sole mothers" to 
"single mothers" to "single teenage mothers". And single 
teenage mothers are obviously economically immoral -
particularly when both abortion and adoption are available. 
Sole mothers in general present problems. By shut-
ting men off from the civilising influence of marriage and 
fatherhood, they are fostering the growth of a rootless, 
aggressive "warrior class". As for their children, a raft of 
studies can be cited to prove that children who are "illegiti-
mate" and/or have a "sole parent" fare worse than children 
in "two-parent families", "intact families", or even just "fami-
lies". What is not made clear is that very few of these studies 
control fully for other major variables, especially income. 
And most of them concern children born to and/or kept 
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by sole mothers in an 
era when illegitimacy 
and sole parenting 
were stigmatised and 
punished in precisely 
the ways the New 
Right now wants to 
restore. 
It is far too soon to 
know how today's so 
called "illegitimate" 
children are faring. 
What we do know is 
that teenage women 
make up only 4% of all 
female sole parents; 
that the vast majority 
of sole parents were once partnered; that most have only one 
or two children; that between 30 and 38% already have some 
paid work (though they are not classified as "employed"); 
and that sole parent families continue to cluster heavily at 
the bottom end of the income scale. 
The 1991 census was taken before the benefit cuts 
and state rent increases. It showed that 57% of Pakeha 
sole parents, 75% of Pacific Islands sole parents and 78% 
of Maori sole parents reported annual incomes of less 
than $15,000. We also know that the only way most women 
manage to get off the domestic purposes benefit is not by 
finding a job which pays enough to live on, but by finding 
a new male partner. In view of the large disparities be-
tween women and men across the main earning years age 
groups, this is hardly surprising. 
The New Right are right about one thing. Welfare 
dependency is only a symptom- but not of moral decay. 
It is a symptom of how successfully policies undermining 
wages, working conditions and social services have com-
bined with rapid post-industrial economic shifts to 
destabilise unpaid caring work. 
The core problem is how to support parents in ways 
whkh enable them to combine earning a living and tak-
ing adequate care of their children, when reliable, 
high-quality childcare is still beyond the reach of many 
families, when secure jobs featuring adequate wages and 
manageable hours are becoming the exception rather than 
the norm, and when high unemployment or quasi-unem-
ployment shows every sign of being here to stay. 
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There is some heartening evidence of radically new 
approaches. The DSW briefing papers, for example, in-
clude two remarkable short sections. The one on 
"Individual Units of Entitlement" points out that lump-
ing a couple's income together in assessing entitlement to 
benefit often keeps them both out of the workforce -
hence the rising numbers of children with "neither parent 
in paid work". It notes that Australia has recently moved 
to a system of abating benefits only against the income of 
the individual concerned.<osw 199'""l 
The second section is on "Basic Income Models", or 
universal basic income schemes. It says they can reduce 
high abatement rates and accommodate casual or part-
time employment. However, it also states (contrary to the 
available evidence) that such schemes "can discourage 
people from working or earning more". Still, it suggests 
that variants of this model are worth exploring.<DSW 199"'22> 
Against these tentative signs of realistic analysis, the 
New Right is mounting an enormous, well co-ordinated 
effort to convince enough people that what is needed is a 
return to the workhouse approach to welfare. But for 
most poor families, in or out of paid work, the problem is 
not welfare dependency and moral decay. It is poverty 
and stress. Forcing thousands more into the workforce 
cannot revive 1950s marriage patterns, any more than it 
can bring back the 1950s labour market, soaring rates of 
teenage pregnancy, or silence about domestic violence. 
US family sociology professor Frank Furstenberg points 
out that "We are no more likely to restore the conjugal 
family rooted in the ideal [but not the practice!] of premari-
tal sexual chastity, early and lifelong monogamy, and a 
sharply drawn division of labour between men and women 
than we are to bring back the family farm."<F"~""""'•·'''"'8l 
Caring work is lasting longer and demanding more 
resources. But viable employment seems set to go on 
eroding away, as technology gets cheaper and staff get 
dearer. In March 1997, the official unemployment rate 
was 1 in 16 people, but the jobless rate was 1 in 9 people. 
The official unemployment rate for Maori rose by 1% to 
16.2%, and for Pacific Islands people it rose by 2% to 
16.9%. For the first time in recent years, the official female 
rate of 6.7% was higher than the official male rate of 6.2%. 
According to the Labour Market Bulletin(!· 1996'83>, real 
weekly and hourly earnings of wage and salary earners 
declined between 1984 and 1994, but the median hourly 
rate for men fell more steeply (by 10.3%) than the median 
hourly rate for women (which fell by 2.2%). For women in 
full-time employment there was a rise of 1.0%, but for 
women in part-time employment (37% of employed fe-
males) there was a fall of 6.5%. Because men's wages 
declined more, the ratio of women's to men's hourly earn-
ings narrowed, from 0.79 in 1984 to 0.89 in 1992. Thereafter, 
however (ie, in the period following the introduction of 
the Employment Contracts Act, which effectively ren-
dered the Equal Pay Act inoperative), the ratio fell back to 
0.86. So the gap is now widening again. 
Perhaps we should just stop pretending that we live 
in a society which values anything beyond the market. 
We could put up for sale at birth all babies whose parents 
can't support them till they are old enough to work. Then we 
could humanely dispose of all the disabled and frail elderly 
who can't fund their own care. That would leave the rest free 
to scratch a living from the market as best they can. 
Or else we can find new, effective, sustainable ways 
to support caring work in the real world, even if that 
means higher taxes on business profits and capital gains . 
A social responsibility act would be a good place to start. 
Unless we solve this problem - unless we work out how to 
get the dirty washing done- we and our society are history. 
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